Society NK + SK Coming Soon?

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Banchan

The Most Dangerous Dame
Oct 2, 2017
4,516
2,901
I dunno what you're trying to say here.
But you usually back your arguments with anecdotal evidence (the weakest kind of evidence) and then call names because your 'truth' is presented in a caustic and demeaning manor.

You might have good insight but it's so wrapped in abrasive characteristics and deflection no one will listen.
These are facts not anecdotal.

They were saying I was lying about United States disregarding the armistince and making the penninsula nuclear first. They were content with their narrative that all problems are because the Kim's are crazy.
 

Truck Party

TMMAC Addict
Mar 16, 2017
5,711
6,850
That's the problem. You see with Koreans you f up really big once, you are a f up for life. Let me give you an example. The armstince agreement signed after the war had a clause that no new weapons will be introduced into the penninsula. In 1959 United States said they can amend the armistice at their choosing and brought in nuclear missiles into South Korea. This is how the whole path to nuclearization started for North Korea. Then add the joint military drills, then Clinton's empty Framework promise. They don't trust you. No amount of honesty now will change what happened in the past. They will not give up their weapons. The US failed to keep promises with them over and over and that's the truth.

FY Splinty @Splinty saying this is what got me banned from OG. Not really fair imo they are not up for hearing anything negative about US. Understandable that Americans are Patriots but the truth is the truth.

Now I'm not saying that US didn't have reason to be suspicious of North Korea to not want to keep their promises but we often see a situation through a one sided lens and that's the lens North Korea see the situation through.
First of all I'd tell you to calm down

You're now putting your years of issues onto Kim & Trump, Kim said he buried the past so perhaps you should move on like he has
 

Banchan

The Most Dangerous Dame
Oct 2, 2017
4,516
2,901
First of all I'd tell you to calm down

You're now putting your years of issues onto Kim & Trump, Kim said he buried the past so perhaps you should move on like he has
I've been saying back on sherdog the real reason why NK is big deal to US is the selling of arms and military technology to rogue groups where US doesn't want them and may potentially be involved and not really any direct military conflict with North Korea. You're shooting way off on the real problem.
 

Banchan

The Most Dangerous Dame
Oct 2, 2017
4,516
2,901
Was a giant waste of money and Moon is bankrupting the country. He's like Korea's Trudeau.
 
Jan 11, 2016
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Undeclared North Korea: Missile Operating Bases Revealed
  • Though the subject of speculation by open-source researchers for years, new research undertaken by Beyond Parallel has located 13 of an estimated 20 North Korean missile operating bases that are undeclared by the government.
  • The first of these reports by Beyond Parallel will focus on the missile base at Sakkanmol, one of the closest to the demilitarized zone and to Seoul, South Korea.
  • These missile operating bases, which can be used for all classes of ballistic missile from short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) up to and including intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), would presumably have to be subject to declaration, verification, and dismantlement in any final and fully verifiable denuclearization deal.
  • Missile operating bases are not launch facilities. While missiles could be launched from within them in an emergency, Korean People’s Army (KPA) operational procedures call for missile launchers to disperse from the bases to pre-surveyed or semi-prepared launch sites for operations.
  • The dispersed deployment of these bases and distinctive tactics employed by ballistic missile units are combined with decades of extensive camouflage, concealment and deception practices to maximize the survival of its missile units from preemptive strikes and during wartime operations.
  • The KPA’s Strategic Force—responsible for operating ballistic missiles—is both sizable and capable of inflicting significant damage even when its missiles are armed with only conventional warheads.
  • Since his assumption of power in 2011, Kim Jong-un’s emphasis upon realistic training and increased operational readiness has extended to the Strategic Force.
While a considerable body of open-source information is available concerning the development of North Korea’s individual missile systems, much less is available concerning the number, deployment, and organization of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) ballistic missile operating bases. The vast majority of the information that is available tends to be internally inconsistent, incomplete, confusing, or simply incorrect.

Media reporting and defector statements have identified in excess of 65 areas or locations as ballistic missile operating bases. While there remains significant uncertainty as to whether all missile operating bases have been identified within the open-source, this number is obviously incorrect and largely a result of inaccurate and frequently internally inconsistent media reporting and defector statements; circular verification; errors in incorrectly identifying surface-to-air missile, coastal defense cruise missile, and rocket launcher bases as ballistic missile bases; use of generalized (e.g., province, county, or nearby city names) and often different location information (e.g., two different counties) for the same facility; challenges in transliterating location data; and difficulty in disambiguating place names.

Compounding these challenges is the fact that the KPA engages in an aggressive camouflage, concealment, and deception (CCD) program with regard to its ballistic missile force, the construction of new missile facilities and abandonment of others, and has at times redeployed ballistic missile units to different bases. Added to this is the confusion in distinguishing among brigade-, regiment-, and battalion-sized units. After extensive research, including interviews with North Korean defectors and government, defense, and intelligence officials around the world, many of these issues have been addressed and it appears that the KPA currently has approximately 15-20 missile operating bases.


Overview of the Sakkanmol Missile Operating Base, March 29, 2018. See associated report for more info. (Copyright © 2018 by DigitalGlobe.)


Missile operating bases are permanent facilities that contain a unit’s headquarters, barracks, housing, support, maintenance, and storage facilities. Due to cultural factors and a military policy that states the North remains in a state of war, the majority of KPA missile operating bases display a number of distinct characteristics, including:

  1. They are generally rudimentary in nature, and with the exception of headquarters and cultural structures, possess few large buildings or paved roads.
  2. With only a few exceptions, they are located in mountainous terrain, often spread out within narrow dead-end valleys. This often results in their lacking significant physical security measures and having only a basic entrance security checkpoint.
  3. Excluding their associated agricultural support infrastructure, they are physically small.
  4. They almost always consist of a network of underground facilities (UGF) to house the unit’s transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) or mobile-erector-launchers (MELs), ready inventory of missiles and warheads, and various other technical/launch support vehicles and equipment.
  5. They are not launch facilities. While missiles could be launched from within these bases in an emergency, KPA ballistic missile tactics and doctrine call for TELs and MELs to disperse from missile operating bases to pre-surveyed and semi-prepared launch sites for operations.
  6. These bases simply do not have the appearance of missile operating bases as seen in the United States, Russia, China, or Europe.
There has been occasional, and often sensationalist, media reporting based primarily upon defector reports that the KPA has constructed “underground launch pads,” silo-based or semi-enclosed (e.g., false mountainsides that split open) ballistic missile launch facilities in the northern reaches of the nation. However, no such facilities have been confirmed in open-source or satellite imagery to date.1

Development
Construction of missile operating bases can be traced back to the mid-1960s and the acquisition of the FROG (Free Rocket Over Ground) series of long-range artillery rockets and the establishment of operating bases around Pyongyang and in North Pyongan province. With production of the Hwasong-5 (R-17E Scud) short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) beginning in 1986, North Korea based these systems in the Pyongyang area and North Pyongan province.

Subsequently, as the number of available Hwasong-5 missiles and their associated TELs and new MELs slowly increased, a Scud regiment was established and deployed south of Pyongyang in 1988.2 Accompanying this, and extending into the early 1990s, the KPA initiated the construction of dedicated missile operating bases in North Hwanghae and Kangwon provinces along the demilitarized zone (DMZ).3

Some of these and later bases were created by converting existing military facilities to accommodate the ballistic missile units and their equipment. With the introduction of the Hwasong-6 (Scud C), the KPA both reorganized and expanded Scud missile units and established new units.4 By the mid-1990s, construction of additional missile operating bases was begun within South Pyongan, North Pyongan, Chagang, Ryanggang, and South Hamgyong provinces to house units equipped with the newer Hwasong-7 (Nodong) and Hwasong-9 (Scud-ER) families of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM).5 Construction of missile operating bases continued into the early 2000s. Since that time, there has been minor but continued development at existing bases and the construction of at least one additional missile operating base to house newer or longer-range ballistic missiles (e.g., Hwasong-11/-12/-13/-14).6

Following Kim Jong-un’s ascension to power in December 2011, he instituted widespread changes throughout the KPA emphasizing realistic training and increased operational readiness. These changes soon resulted in the reorganization of the Strategic Rocket Command into the Strategic Force during 2013 as well as significant infrastructure developments at a number of missile operating bases.

Deployment
The ballistic missile operating bases are small, dispersed throughout the nation, and, with few exceptions, located in narrow mountain valleys. The deployment pattern has evolved over time, garnering a variety of descriptions, but today it is most commonly described as consisting of the three “belts”: the Tactical (or Forward), the Operational, and the Strategic (or Strategic Rear) based upon their physical distance from the DMZ.7

General Arrangement of North Korea’s Ballistic Missile “Belts.”

The Tactical Belt extends across North Hwanghae and Kangwon provinces and is 50-90 km north of the DMZ. Missile operating bases situated within the Tactical Belt are reportedly equipped with the Scud family of SRBMs—perhaps with a small number of Nodong MRBMs. The locations chosen for these bases are far enough forward to provide coverage of critical facilities in the northern two-thirds of South Korea, yet far enough from the DMZ to be beyond the range of South Korean and U.S. long-range artillery.8 The fielding of the longer-ranged Hwasong-6 and Hwasong-9 (Scud-ER) placed the entirety of South Korea (including the island of Cheju-do) within range of these forward bases.9

The Operational Belt extends across the mountainous sections of South Pyongan province and the southern section of South Hamgyong province and is 90-150 km north of the DMZ. This belt is reportedly equipped with Nodong missiles or longer-range systems that cover all of South Korea and Japan. The Strategic Belt extends across the mountainous sections of North Pyongan, Chagang, Ryanggang, and the northern section of South Hamgyong province and is more than 150 km north of the DMZ. The units deployed in this zone were initially equipped with Nodong missiles. However, reports often claim that the Taepodong 1 MRBM and Taepodong 2 ICBM were also deployed here.10 These bases will likely house the newer Hwasong-11/-12/-13/-14 as they become deployed.

The official designations for any of the missile operating bases, or the units deployed at them, are unknown. They are, however, reportedly assigned cover designations (military unit cover designator—MUCD in U.S. and South Korean terminology) such as the “Fourth Training Center” or “Fifth Training Center.”11

The deployment pattern of the KPA’s ballistic missile operating bases is logical for a nation that still believes it is in a state of war and must be ready to defend itself from outside aggression at any time. It is also a recognition of the fact that the Korean People’s Air and Anti-air Force (KPAF) will be unable to deter a combined South Korean and U.S. air and missile offensive against the nation. The dispersed nature, small size of operating bases, and tactics and doctrine employed by ballistic missile units provide the best chances for their survival given the KPA’s technology and capabilities.

Combat Operations
From the little open-source information available on the subject, a preliminary pattern of KPA wartime ballistic missile operations can be pieced together. If hostilities resume with little or no warning, a TEL or MEL will move out of its UGF to the base’s drive-through arming and fueling facility. Here, a missile will be loaded—if one isn’t already—armed, fueled and system checks will be conducted. The launcher will then move a short distance within the base, launch at pre-assigned targets, and return to its UGF or disperse to a pre-arranged location—potentially to a UGF away from the base.

If, however, a new conflict is anticipated, prior to the start of hostilities, the missile unit and technical support elements will deploy from the base. The TELs or MELs will move out from their UGF to the base’s drive-through servicing (e.g., arming, fueling, and maintenance) facility and then disperse to another UGF or to a network of pre-surveyed launch sites throughout their area of responsibility—often no more than a wide spot in a road. Here, they will then wait for orders to launch.

Once they launch, the TELs or MELs will quickly displace to another pre-surveyed launch position or UGF (other than those at the missile operating base) where they will meet up with the technical support element and its equipment (i.e., reload missiles, warheads, fuel, crane vehicles, etc.). Once serviced and rearmed, the technical support elements will move to another prearranged location while the TEL or MEL will either wait for a launch order or move to another pre-surveyed launch position and wait there for a launch order.

As the conflict develops, rather than returning to an operating base—which will undoubtedly be the target of repeated attacks—both the technical support element and launchers will remain in the field using pre-positioned reloads and supplies while moving frequently to different pre-surveyed locations. The missile operating base, or more likely a preplanned dispersal UGF, will function as a technical support base with technical support elements and launchers infrequently returning.

These dispersed mode operating procedures concede the absence of air superiority, minimize the loss of the technical support element, and address the reality that a single TEL or MEL with a liquid fuel missile requires approximately 30 minutes from arrival at a pre-surveyed position to prepare, launch, and begin redeployment—a long time on the modern battlefield for a highly visible target. The loss of a single launcher, while significant, does not adversely impact the overall ability of the surviving elements of the unit to conduct combat operations. However, due to its essential role in the larger organization, the destruction or neutralization of the technical support element would severely impact the ability of the parent unit to conduct launch operations. Therefore, additional procedures are in place to facilitate its survival.

Research Note
This report is based upon an ongoing study of the Korean People’s Army ballistic missile infrastructure begun by one of the authors (Joseph Bermudez) in 1985, which itself is based upon numerous interviews with North Korean defectors and government, defense, and intelligence officials around the world. While some of the information used in the preparation of this study may eventually prove to be incomplete or incorrect, it is hoped that it provides a new and unique open-source look into the subject that other can build on. The information presented here supersedes or updates previous works by J. Bermudez on these subjects.
North Korea is still working on its ballistic missile program, say U.S. officials
North Korea is continuing work on its ballistic missile program, U.S. officials briefed on recent intelligence tell NBC News, confirming the gist of a private report Monday detailing recent improvements made at undeclared military sites.

A separate analysis by the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, provided exclusively to NBC News, describes a secret military base deep in North Korea’s interior that analysts believe could house missiles capable of reaching the United States.

American defense officials stressed that they consider it a positive development that North Korea has not conducted a nuclear test since September 2017.

"North Korea has continued its ballistic missile program at a number of bases but it's significant that they have not tested one in nearly a year," one official said. "We need to give the diplomats time and space to work."

Nonetheless, the recent intelligence, and the private satellite photos of work on undeclared missile sites, underscore the widespread belief among experts that President Donald Trump's pronouncement that the world no longer has to worry about a North Korean nuclear program is divorced from reality.

"It looks as if it is a political charade, and it's a dangerous one," retired Gen. Barry McCaffrey told NBC News. "In the short term, North Korea is the most consequential threat to U.S. national security we're facing....They have nuclear weapons, they have delivery systems, they are not going to denuclearize. So I think the outcome of all of this is we're loosening the economic constraints on these people and we're kidding ourselves."



The private report released Monday said researchers had identified 13 of an estimated 20 undeclared North Korean missile bases, and included a detailed analysis of one facility, the Sakkanmol Missile Operating Base, about 50 miles north of the Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Korea.

The report was prepared by a group called Beyond Parallel, a program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. It was led by Victor Cha, a former diplomat who was considered by the Trump administration for the job of ambassador to South Korea, but could not get on board with Trump's approach.

Separately, Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, provided NBC News with his group’s analysis of one of the most important facilities, located near Yeongjeo-dong, deep in the interior of North Korea and extending to the Chinese border.

The location makes it a strong candidate for basing North Korea’s longest range missiles, Lewis has concluded. The site has been identified by defectors, but Lewis found it on satellite imagery and observed work ongoing there as recently as last year.

“The missile facility at Yeongjeo-dong remains an active military base, with a number of hardened and underground structures for launching ballistic missiles,” Lewis wrote. While one defector said it was built to house medium-range Nodong missiles, “other evidence suggests the site was constructed to house longer range-missiles that would need to be rolled out from tunnels, erected and launched."

After Trump met North Korean leader Kim Jong Un at a historic summit in Singapore in June, North Korea did not agree to stop working on its nuclear program. Instead, Kim signed a vague declaration agreeing to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," a phrase that was not defined.

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said last month that a second summit between the two leaders would be scheduled as part of diplomatic talks that he described as promising. But even as these talks have been ongoing, North Korea continues to work on its nuclear program. U.S. intelligence officials, including CIA Director Gina Haspel, have expressed public skepticism about the North's willingness to give up its weapons.



Hidden North Korean missile sites are 'nothing new,' South Korea says
"North Korea never pledged a promise to abandon this missile sites," a spokesman for South Korea's president said.
If any country should be worried about Kim Jong Un's nuclear weapons, it's South Korea, technically still at war with North Korea and with tens of millions of people in easy range of its arsenal.

But on Tuesday, Seoul reacted with something of a shrug to news that more than a dozen of North Korea's hidden missile sites had been identified by U.S. researchers using satellite images.

The reason for this, experts said, is that the agreement signed by Kim and President Donald Trump in June was so vague that it did not bind North Korea to do anything at all — let alone to give up the location of its secret bases.

"There is nothing new" here, Kim Eui Keum, spokesman to South Korean President Moon Jae-in, told a briefing Tuesday. North Korea "has never signed any agreement, any negotiation that makes shutting down missile bases mandatory."

The 13 undeclared North Korean missile operating bases were identified Monday by Beyond Parallel, a program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, or CSIS. The researchers at the Washington think tank said they believe there are at least another seven they haven't yet found.

These are not launch sites, but rather mostly mountainous locations where missiles, warheads, launchers and personnel are stationed, ready to be deployed elsewhere in the event of an attack.

Later Monday, U.S. officials told NBC News that the North is continuing development of its weapons program.

The controversy is not over the CSIS report itself but how it has been characterized in the media.

Although the South Korean spokesman said there was "nothing new" in the research, he went on to suggest it was "more detailed" than information obtained by his own government and even Washington.

Many experts say the research is valuable in that it confirms unverified reports that had been long circulated among analysts. They also say that it definitively debunks Trump's claims that "total denuclearization ... has already started," as the president put it last Thursday.

The bases show "how far the reality ... diverges from the claim that the negotiations have already succeeded," Sue Mi Terry, a senior fellow at CSIS, tweeted.

The CSIS report drew few if any political conclusions, noting only that the missile sites would likely have to be dismantled as part of any Kim-Trump deal.

However, there was criticism of the way the report had been portrayed in the news, namely the New York Times' assertion that the findings showed a "great deception" by North Korea.

"There is a phrase, 'great deception,' used in articles, but North Korea has never promised to shut down this missile base," said Kim, the South Korean spokesman, referring to one of the facilities, Sakkanmol, mentioned by CSIS. "It has never signed any agreement, any negotiation that makes shutting down missile bases mandatory."

Not only has North Korea never pledged to abandon these sites described in the report, it has never pledged to acknowledge they exist, the spokesman reminded.

In June, Trump and Kim signed an agreement that pledged to "work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."

Experts said this was very vague, with no detail on how "denuclearization" should happen or what the word even means (the U.S. and North Korea have different ideas).

"There were no specifics or written commitments for detailed scheduling over what to do with North Korea's weapons of mass destruction," said Go Myong Hyun, a research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, a think tank in Seoul, South Korea. "It was a loosely worded joint agreement."

Since then, negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea have stuttered.

Many observers, including the CIA, believe that Kim has no intention of ever giving up his nuclear weapons. His negotiators, the argument goes, are continuing talks with the U.S. and South Korea in the hope of getting other concessions along the way.

Trump has often taken credit for North Korea halting tests of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.

In his new-year's address this January, the young dictator Kim offered a different explanation. He said that North Korea had done all the the testing it needs; now was the time to build up its arsenal.

"The nuclear weapons research sector and the rocket industry should mass-produce nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles, the power and reliability of which have already been proved to the full," he said.

In this sense, North Korea continuing production at a network of secret bases should come as little surprise. It's exactly what Kim said he would do.
 
Jan 11, 2016
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North Korea says it will not denuclearize until the US eliminates 'nuclear threat'
North Korea will not relinquish its nuclear weapons until the US eliminates its own "nuclear threat," according to a commentary published by state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
"The proper definition of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is completely eliminating the American nuclear threat to North Korea before eliminating our nuclear capability," the commentary says.
The US and North Korea are deadlocked in negotiations over how Pyongyang will denuclearize in return for the easing of sanctions.
On June 12 in Singapore, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and US President Donald Trump signed a vaguely worded pledge to "work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." However, in the six months since, talks have stalled and North Korean criticism of the US has sharpened, though Pyongyang has continued to heap praise on Trump.
The commentary published Thursday suggests one obstacle in the negotiations could be US military assets based in South Korea and the protection of South Korea under the US nuclear umbrella.
North Korea has repeatedly refused calls for the US for it to unilaterally denuclearize.
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said Thursday that we "still are working through the execution of Chairman Kim's commitment to denuclearize," but insisted the US is "undoubtedly" in a better situation with Pyongyang than it was a year ago.
"Undoubtedly," Pompeo said when asked by Kansas radio station KNSS. "No more missiles being tested, no more nuclear testing. We're in a better place today."
Pompeo noted that he's traveled to North Korea "now, oh goodness, three or four times. We'll continue to have meetings, and we are hopeful that in the new year President Trump and Chairman Kim will get together not too long after the first of the year and make even further progress on taking this threat to the United States away from us."
Asked about the presence of nuclear weapons on the peninsula, a US defense official said "we do not discuss the location of nuclear weapons; however, in the early '90s, President George H. W. Bush announced the withdrawal of all naval and land-based tactical nuclear weapons deployed abroad."
The KCNA commentary said that "when talking about the Korean peninsula, it encompasses not only our republic's territory but also South Korea where the American nuclear weapons and armed forces for invasion are spread out. When talking about denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, [the US] needs to know that it means eliminating all nuclear threat factors."
 
Jan 11, 2016
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North Korea's Kim says a 'new path' is inevitable if the US demands unilateral action
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un reaffirmed on Tuesday his resolve to completely denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, but warned he may have to take an alternative path if the United States continued to force Pyongyang into unilateral action.


In his New Year address, Kim said he was willing to meet U.S. President Donald Trump again at any time to achieve denuclearization, and urged Washington to take unspecified corresponding action to speed up the stalled process.


North Korea, however, would have "no option but to explore a new path in order to protect our sovereignty" if the United States "miscalculates our people's patience, forces something upon us and pursues sanctions and pressure without keeping a promise it made in front of the world," Kim said in his nationally televised address.


The comments are likely to fuel growing skepticism over whether Pyongyang intends to give up the nuclear weapons program that it has long considered essential to its security.


Kim and Trump vowed to work towards denuclearization and build a "lasting and stable" peace regime at their landmark summit in Singapore in June, but little progress has been made since and satellite images have indicated continued activity at North Korea's nuclear and missile facilities.


Pyongyang has demanded Washington lift sanctions and declare an official end to the 1950-53 Korean War in response to its initial, unilateral steps toward denuclearization, including dismantling its only known nuclear testing site and a key missile engine facility.


U.S. officials say those steps can be easily reversed and have not been verified, and Washington has slapped additional economic sanctions on the impoverished country. Washington halted some large-scale military exercises with Seoul, although smaller drills continued.


Kim called for South Korea to "completely stop" joint military drills with the United States involving strategic assets, while multilateral negotiations should be pursued to build a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.


"Now that North and South Korea decided to take the path of peace and prosperity, we insist that joint military exercises with outside forces should no longer be allowed and deployment of war equipment such as outside strategic assets should be completely stopped," Kim said.


Analysts said Kim's message sent clear signals that North Korea is willing to stay in talks with Washington and Seoul this year — but on its own terms.


"North Korea seems determined in 2019 to receive some sort of sanctions relief ... The challenge, however, is will Team Trump be willing to back away from its position of zero sanctions relief?" said Harry J. Kazianis at the Washington-based Centre for the National Interest.


"Kim's remarks seem to suggest his patience with America is wearing thin."


The televised speech is closely watched as a rare public appearance for the young leader, setting the tone for his domestic and foreign policies for the year ahead.


After racing toward the goal of developing a nuclear-tipped missile capable of hitting the United States in 2017, Kim used last year's speech to call for defusing tensions and improving ties with the South, and a shift in focus toward economic development.


That resulted in a dramatic detente last year, including three summits with South Korean President Moon Jae-in, and the historic meeting with Trump in June.


In this year's 30-minute speech, Kim spent more than 20 minutes highlighting his new focus on the economy.


Kim said inter-Korean relations have now entered a "completely new phase", and he is willing to resume key joint economic projects with the South — the factory park in Kaesong and tours to Mt. Kumgang — without conditions.
 

Hauler

It takes twice as long to build bridges you burn.
Feb 3, 2016
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When was the last time NK fired off a test missile?
 

Hauler

It takes twice as long to build bridges you burn.
Feb 3, 2016
33,506
45,185
Trump: We could have signed a deal but the terms weren't acceptable. When negotiating, you should always be prepared to walk away.

Business 101.

But I'm sure CNN will shit all over it.
 

Former Maycee Barber Fan

Who is Maycee Barber Fan?
Dec 1, 2015
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Trump: We could have signed a deal but the terms weren't acceptable. When negotiating, you should always be prepared to walk away.

Business 101.

But I'm sure CNN will shit all over it.
Neither side is willing to give up what the other demands. It's got nothing to do with negotiating skills. Trump is either a complete moron or knows this and is lying to people like you.
.
A good negotiator will always have red lines they refuse to concede and be willing to walk away, but they will also know that the the other side, even if completely incompetent (which the North Koreans most certainly are not), will have their own red lines too. If you're not willing to offer anything past that, then there's no fucking point in negotiating in the first place.

Pretty impressive narrative Trump has spun to his idiotic base though. When he makes a deal, it's because he's a brilliant dealmaker. When he doesn't, it's because he's a brilliant and strong dealmaker. Win-win.
 

Hauler

It takes twice as long to build bridges you burn.
Feb 3, 2016
33,506
45,185
Neither side is willing to give up what the other demands. It's got nothing to do with negotiating skills. Trump is either a complete moron or knows this and is lying to people like you.
.
A good negotiator will always have red lines they refuse to concede and be willing to walk away, but they will also know that the the other side, even if completely incompetent (which the North Koreans most certainly are not), will have their own red lines too. If you're not willing to offer anything past that, then there's no fucking point in negotiating in the first place.

Pretty impressive narrative Trump has spun to his idiotic base though. When he makes a deal, it's because he's a brilliant dealmaker. When he doesn't, it's because he's a brilliant and strong dealmaker. Win-win.
So he should just sign anything?

I don't trust Trump any further than I can throw his fat ass, but just giving in to whatever NK asks for is dumb, and if he did that the same people that are screaming about him NOT making a deal would be screaming about him making a deal. The guy can't win.

The missile launches have stopped and we at least have some level of communication with that country. That's a win whether you like it or not.
 

Former Maycee Barber Fan

Who is Maycee Barber Fan?
Dec 1, 2015
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So he should just sign anything?

I don't trust Trump any further than I can throw his fat ass, but just giving in to whatever NK asks for is dumb, and if he did that the same people that are screaming about him NOT making a deal would be screaming about him making a deal. The guy can't win.

The missile launches have stopped and we at least have some level of communication with that country. That's a win whether you like it or not.
How the fuck is it a 'win'? A win is when you get what you want.